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Quine often argued for a simple, untyped system of logic rather than
the typed systems that were championed by Russell and Carnap, among
others. He claimed that nothing important would be lost by eliminating
sorts, and the result would be additional simplicity and elegance. In
support of this claim, Quine conjectured that every many-sorted theory
is equivalent to a single-sorted theory. We make this conjecture precise,
and prove that it’s true, at least according to one reasonable notion of
theoretical equivalence. Our clarification of Quine’s conjecture, however,
exposes the shortcomings of his argument against many-sorted logic.
Introduction
During the last century, an idea about the relationship between many-sorted
logic and single-sorted logic became a piece of folklore. Many logicians endorsed
the idea that many-sorted and single-sorted logic are mere “notational variants”
of one another, and that the two frameworks have precisely the same expressive
power. One particularly natural way to put this idea is as follows:
Every many-sorted theory is equivalent to a single-sorted theory.
Quine was one of the most famous proponents of this claim.1 For this reason,
we call the claim Quine’s conjecture.
∗The authors can be reached at thomaswb@princeton.edu and hhalvors@princeton.edu.
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. This material
is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. DGE
1148900.
1See in particular Quine (1951, 69–71), Quine (1960, 209–10), and Quine (1963, 267–8).
He explains the conjecture as follows: “We can always reduce multiple sorts of variables to
one sort if we adopt appropriate predicates. Wherever we might have used a special sort of
variable we may use instead a general variable and restrict it to the appropriate predicate”
(Quine, 1963, 268). Quine (1969, 92) expresses the same idea when he remarks that “notations
with one style of variables and notations with many are intertranslatable.” Quine (1937, 1938,
1956) provides support for the conjecture by describing a method of “translating” between
many-sorted and single-sorted logic and applying it to NBG set theory and Russell’s theory of
types. Of course, the fact that sorts can be eliminated (or, better, unified) was also discussed
in the pure logic literature. For example, see Schmidt (1951).
1
In this paper, we aim to capture the sense in which Quine’s conjecture is
true. Although the basic idea behind the conjecture is clear, before proving it
one needs to make precise what it might mean for two many-sorted theories to
be “equivalent.” We consider two precise versions of Quine’s conjecture. We
show that the first version of the conjecture is false, but we prove the second.
Preliminaries
We begin with some preliminaries about theories in many-sorted logic.2 A
signature Σ is a set of sort symbols, predicate symbols, function symbols, and
constant symbols. Σ must contain at least one sort symbol, and the predicate,
function, and constant symbols in Σ are assigned arities constructed from the
sorts in Σ. The only difference from the syntax of single-sorted logic is that
the quantifiers ∀σ and ∃σ that appear in Σ-formulas must be indexed by sorts
σ ∈ Σ.
Given a signature Σ, a Σ-theory T is a set of Σ-sentences. The sentences
φ ∈ T are called the axioms of T . If the signature Σ has only one sort symbol,
then a Σ-theory T is called a single-sorted theory, while if Σ has more than
one sort symbol, then T is called a many-sorted theory. A Σ-structure M
is a model of a Σ-theory T if M  φ for all φ ∈ T , where  is the standard
notion of logical consequence. A theory T entails a sentence φ, written T  φ,
if M  φ for every model M of T .
We begin with the following preliminary criterion for theoretical equivalence.
Definition. Theories T1 and T2 are logically equivalent if they have the same
class of models.
One can verify that theories T1 and T2 are logically equivalent if and only if
they entail precisely the same sentences. It is therefore easy to see that logical
equivalence is too strict to capture any sense in which Quine’s conjecture is
true. Theories can only be logically equivalent if they are formulated in the
same signature, so no many-sorted theory is logically equivalent to a single-
sorted theory.
Logical equivalence is a strict criterion for theoretical equivalence, so logi-
cians and philosophers of science have proposed other more general criteria.3
We will begin by considering a criterion called definitional equivalence that was
2We here take for granted some basic definitions. The reader is encouraged to consult
Hodges (2008) and Barrett and Halvorson (2015b) for details.
3See Quine (1975), Sklar (1982), Halvorson (2012, 2013, 2015), Glymour (2013),
Van Fraassen (2014), and Coffey (2014) for general discussion of theoretical equivalence in
philosophy of science. See Glymour (1977), North (2009), Swanson and Halvorson (2012),
Curiel (2014), Knox (2011, 2013), Barrett (2014), Weatherall (2015a,b,c), and Rosenstock
et al. (2015) for discussion of whether or not particular physical theories should be considered
theoretically equivalent. Finally, see de Bouve´re (1965), Kanger (1968), Pinter (1978), Pel-
letier and Urquhart (2003), Andre´ka et al. (2005), Friedman and Visser (2014), and Barrett
and Halvorson (2015a,b) for some results that have been proven about varieties of theoretical
equivalence.
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introduced into philosophy of science by Glymour (1971, 1977, 1980). In order
to describe this criterion, we need to do some work.
Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures and let p ∈ Σ+−Σ be a predicate symbol of arity
σ1 × . . .× σn. An explicit definition of p in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of
the form
∀σ1x1 . . . ∀σnxn
(
p(x1, . . . , xn)↔ φ(x1, . . . , xn)
)
where φ(x1, . . . , xn) is a Σ-formula. Similarly, an explicit definition of a function
symbol f ∈ Σ+ − Σ of arity σ1 × . . .× σn → σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x1 . . . ∀σnxn∀σy
(
f(x1, . . . , xn) = y ↔ φ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
)
(1)
and an explicit definition of a constant symbol c ∈ Σ+ − Σ of sort σ is a Σ+-
sentence of the form
∀σx
(
x = c↔ ψ(x)) (2)
where φ(x1, . . . , xn, y) and ψ(x) are both Σ-formulas. Note that in all of these
cases it must be that the sorts σ1, . . . , σn, σ ∈ Σ.
Although they are Σ+-sentences, (1) and (2) have consequences in the signa-
ture Σ. In particular, (1) and (2) imply the following sentences, respectively:4
∀σ1x1 . . . ∀σnxn∃σ=1y φ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
∃σ=1xψ(x)
These two sentences are called the admissibility conditions for the explicit
definitions (1) and (2).
We now have the resources necessary to describe the concept of a defini-
tional extension. Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures and T a Σ-theory. A definitional
extension of T to Σ+ is a Σ+-theory
T+ = T ∪ {δs : s ∈ Σ+ − Σ}
that satisfies the following two conditions. First, for each symbol s ∈ Σ+ − Σ
the sentence δs is an explicit definition of s in terms of Σ, and second, if s is a
constant symbol or a function symbol and αs is the admissibility condition for
δs, then T  αs.
One can think of a definitional extension of a theory as “saying no more”
than the original theory (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b). It simply allows one to
add “abbreviations” of old formulas to the theory. With this thought in mind,
we can describe definitional equivalence.
Definition. Let T1 be a Σ1-theory and T2 be a Σ2-theory. T1 and T2 are
definitionally equivalent if there are theories T+1 and T
+
2 that satisfy the
following three conditions:
• T+1 is a definitional extension of T1,
4We will use the notation ∃σ=nxφ(x) throughout to abbreviate the sentence “there exist
exactly n things of sort σ that are φ.”
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• T+2 is a definitional extension of T2,
• T+1 and T+2 are logically equivalent Σ1 ∪ Σ2-theories.
One often says that T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent if they have a
“common definitional extension.” The intuition behind definitional equivalence
is simple: T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent if T1 can define all of the
vocabulary that T2 uses, and in a compatible way, T2 can define all of the
vocabulary that T1 uses. Definitional equivalence captures a sense in which two
theories are “intertranslatable” (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015a).
One can easily verify that definitional equivalence is a strictly weaker cri-
terion than logical equivalence. Unlike logical equivalence, theories in different
signatures can be definitionally equivalent. But definitional equivalence is still
incapable of capturing any sense in which Quine’s conjecture is true. As we have
described it, a definitional extension does not allow one to define new sorts. If T1
and T2 are definitionally equivalent, therefore, they must be formulated in sig-
natures with the same sort symbols. So no many-sorted theory is definitionally
equivalent to a single-sorted theory.
Fortunately, there are criteria for theoretical equivalence that are more gen-
eral than definitional equivalence. The one that will be of particular interest
to us is called Morita equivalence.5 Morita equivalence is a natural generaliza-
tion of definitional equivalence. Indeed, it is essentially the same as definitional
equivalence, but it allows one to define new sort symbols in addition to new
predicate, function, and constant symbols.
The first version of Quine’s conjecture that we will consider is the following.
Quine’s conjecture 1
Every theory is Morita equivalent to a single-sorted theory. y
In order to understand Quine’s conjecture 1, we need to carefully describe Morita
equivalence. We begin by discussing how to define new sort symbols. Let
Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures and consider a sort symbol σ ∈ Σ+ − Σ. One can define
the sort σ as a product sort, a coproduct sort, a subsort, or a quotient sort. In
each case one defines σ using old sorts from Σ and new function symbols from
Σ+ − Σ. These new function symbols specify how the new sort σ is related to
the old sorts in Σ. We describe in detail these four ways to define new sorts.
In order to define σ as a product sort, one needs two function symbols
pi1, pi2 ∈ Σ+ − Σ with pi1 of arity σ → σ1, pi2 of arity σ → σ2, and σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ.
The function symbols pi1 and pi2 serve as the “canonical projections” associated
5Quine (1975) proposed his own criteria for equivalence of theories. This criterion suffers
from some serious shortcomings, however, so we will not discuss it here (Barrett and Halvorson,
2015a). Definitional and Morita equivalence each capture a sense in which two theories are
intertranslatable (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015a,b). Theories that are equivalent according to
these criteria, therefore, can be “interpreted” into one another. See Barrett and Halvorson
(2015b) for an introduction to Morita equivalence and Andre´ka et al. (2008) and Mere and
Veloso (1992) for discussion of closely related ideas.
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with the product sort σ. An explicit definition of the symbols σ, pi1, and pi2 as
a product sort in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x∀σ2y∃σ=1z(pi1(z) = x ∧ pi2(z) = y)
One should think of a product sort σ as the sort whose elements are ordered
pairs, where the first element of each pair is of sort σ1 and the second is of sort
σ2.
One can also define σ as a coproduct sort. In this case, one needs two
function symbols ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Σ+ − Σ with ρ1 of arity σ1 → σ, ρ2 of arity σ2 → σ,
and σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ. The function symbols ρ1 and ρ2 are the “canonical injections”
associated with the coproduct sort σ. An explicit definition of the symbols σ, ρ1,
and ρ2 as a coproduct sort in terms of Σ is a Σ
+-sentence of the form
∀σz
(∃σ1=1x(ρ1(x) = z) ∨ ∃σ2=1y(ρ2(y) = z)) ∧ ∀σ1x∀σ2y ¬(ρ1(x) = ρ2(y))
One should think of a coproduct sort σ as the disjoint union of the elements of
sorts σ1 and σ2.
When defining a new sort σ as a product sort or a coproduct sort, one uses
two (not necessarily distinct) sort symbols σ1 and σ2 in Σ and two function
symbols in Σ+ − Σ. The next two ways of defining a new sort σ only require
one sort symbol in Σ and one function symbol in Σ+ − Σ.
In order to define σ as a subsort, one needs a function symbol i ∈ Σ+−Σ of
arity σ → σ1 with σ1 ∈ Σ. The function symbol i is the “canonical inclusion”
associated with the subsort σ. An explicit definition of the symbols σ and i as
a subsort in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x
(
φ(x)↔ ∃σz(i(z) = x)
) ∧ ∀σz1∀σz2(i(z1) = i(z2)→ z1 = z2) (3)
where φ(x) is a Σ-formula. One should think of σ as “the things of sort σ1 that
are φ.” The sentence (3) entails the following Σ-sentence:
∃σ1xφ(x)
As above, we will call this Σ-sentence the admissibility condition for the
definition (3).
Lastly, in order to define σ as a quotient sort one needs a function symbol
 ∈ Σ+ − Σ of arity σ1 → σ with σ1 ∈ Σ. An explicit definition of the symbols
σ and  as a quotient sort in terms of Σ is a Σ+-sentence of the form
∀σ1x1∀σ1x2
(
(x1) = (x2)↔ φ(x1, x2)
) ∧ ∀σz∃σ1x((x) = z) (4)
where φ(x1, x2) is a Σ-formula. This sentence defines σ as a quotient sort
that is obtained by “quotienting out” the sort σ1 with respect to the formula
φ(x1, x2). The sort σ should be thought of as the set of “equivalence classes of
elements of σ1 with respect to the relation φ(x1, x2),” and the function symbol
 is the “canonical projection” that maps an element to its equivalence class.
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And indeed, one can verify that the sentence (4) implies that φ(x1, x2) is an
equivalence relation. In particular, (4) entails the following Σ-sentences:
∀σ1xφ(x, x)
∀σ1x1∀σ1x2(φ(x1, x2)→ φ(x2, x1))
∀σ1x1∀σ1x2∀σ1x3
(
(φ(x1, x2) ∧ φ(x2, x3))→ φ(x1, x3)
)
These Σ-sentences are the admissibility conditions for the definition (4).
Now that we have described the four ways of defining new sort symbols, we
can define the concept of a Morita extension. A Morita extension is a natural
generalization of a definitional extension. The only difference is that now one is
allowed to define new sort symbols. Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures and T a Σ-theory.
A Morita extension of T to the signature Σ+ is a Σ+-theory
T+ = T ∪ {δs : s ∈ Σ+ − Σ}
that satisfies the following three conditions. First, for each symbol s ∈ Σ+ − Σ
the sentence δs is an explicit definition of s in terms of Σ. Second, if σ ∈ Σ+−Σ
is a sort symbol and f ∈ Σ+−Σ is a function symbol that is used in the explicit
definition of σ, then δf = δσ. (For example, if σ is defined as a product sort with
projections pi1 and pi2, then δσ = δpi1 = δpi2 .) And third, if αs is an admissibility
condition for a definition δs, then T  αs.
A Morita extension of a theory again “says no more” than the original theory
(Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b). Like a definitional extension, it can be thought
of simply as a way to add in “abbreviations” of old statements into the theory
T . A Morita extension, however, allows one to abbreviate old statements using
the apparatus of sorts, in addition to the apparatus of predicates, functions, and
constant symbols. Our definition of Morita equivalence is perfectly analogous
to definitional equivalence.
Definition. Let T1 be a Σ1-theory and T2 a Σ2-theory. T1 and T2 are Morita




2 , . . . , T
m
2 that satisfy the
following three conditions:
• Each theory T i+11 is a Morita extension of T i1,
• Each theory T i+12 is a Morita extension of T i2,
• Tn1 and Tm2 are logically equivalent Σ-theories with Σ1 ∪ Σ2 ⊂ Σ.
The intuition behind Morita equivalence is the same as that behind def-
initional equivalence: T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent if they each can, in
compatible ways, define all of the vocabulary that the other uses.
One small clarification can be made about this definition. In order to show
that two theories are Morita equivalent, one is allowed to take a finite number
n of Morita extensions of T1 and a finite number m of Morita extensions of T2.
One might wonder whether any generality is lost if we were to instead define
Morita equivalence as follows:
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(?) T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent if there are logically equivalent theories
T+1 and T
+
2 that are Morita extensions of T1 and T2, respectively.
The following example shows that the proposal (?) is significantly less general
than the standard definition of Morita equivalence provided above.
Example. Let σ1 and σ2 be sort symbols, with c a constant symbol of sort σ1,
d a constant symbol of sort σ2, and i a function symbol of arity σ2 → σ1. We
define the signatures Σ1 = {σ1, c}, Σ2 = {σ1, c, σ2, i}, and Σ3 = {σ1, c, σ2, i, d}




x = c↔ ∃σ2y(i(y) = x)
) ∧ ∀σ2y1∀σ2y2(i(y1) = i(y2)→ y1 = y2)}
T3 = T2 ∪ {∀σ2y
(
y = d↔ i(y) = c)}
It is easy to see that the Σ2-theory T2 is a Morita extension of the Σ1-theory T1,
and that the Σ3-theory T3 is a Morita extension of T2. The theory T2 defines
the sort σ2 as a subsort containing just the “thing that is c,” and T3 then defines
the constant d in such a way that it applies to this new thing. So naturally, one
would like to consider T1 and T3 equivalent. After all, T3 is obtained from T1
simply by defining some new vocabulary.
Although T1 and T3 are Morita equivalent according to the standard defi-
nition, they are not equivalent according to the proposal (?). The axiom of T3
that defines d in terms of Σ2 is not a definition of d in terms of Σ1. And indeed,
there simply is no definition of the constant symbol d in terms of Σ1. Such a
definition would have to be a sentence of the form ∀σ2y (y = d↔ ψ(y)), where
ψ is a Σ1-formula. This expression, however, is not well-formed. The constant
d and variable y are of sort σ2, which is not in Σ1, so ψ cannot be a Σ1-formula.
This means that there is no Morita extension of T1 that defines the constant
symbol d; it takes two Morita extensions of T1 to define d. y
The proposal (?) would therefore not be a satisfactory definition of Morita
equivalence, so we use the standard definition for the remainder of this paper.
One can easily verify that Morita equivalence is a strictly weaker criterion
than definitional equivalence. If two theories are definitionally equivalent, then
they are Morita equivalent. But in general the converse does not hold. As
the above example shows, theories can be Morita equivalent even if they are
formulated in signatures with different sort symbols.
We now consider Quine’s conjecture 1 and show that it is false. The following
theorem provides an example of a theory that is not Morita equivalent to any
single-sorted theory.
Theorem 1. Let Σ1 = {σ1, σ2, . . .} be a signature containing a countable in-
finity of sort symbols. The Σ1-theory T1 = ∅ is not Morita equivalent to any
single-sorted theory.
The idea behind Theorem 1 is simple. One can think of the theory T1 as
saying the following: “Every element is either of kind1 or of kind2 or of kind3
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or. . . , no element is of more than one kind, and there is at least one element of
every kind.” A single-sorted theory in first-order logic simply does not have the
expressive power to say this. (In particular, it cannot express the first conjunct.)
The theory T1 should therefore not be Morita equivalent to any single-sorted
theory. Before proving this we need a simple lemma and some notation.
Lemma. Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures and T a Σ-theory. Suppose that A is a
model of T with Aσ a finite set for every sort σ ∈ Σ. Let T+ be a Morita
extension of T to a signature Σ+ and A+ a model of T+ such that A+|Σ = A.6
Then A+σ is a finite set for every σ ∈ Σ+.
Proof. Let σ ∈ Σ+ − Σ be a sort symbol. We show that A+σ is a finite set in
the cases where σ is defined as a product sort or a subsort. If T+ defines σ as a
product sort of σ1 and σ2, then A
+
σ has exactly as many elements as Aσ1 ×Aσ2 ,
which is finite by assumption. If T+ defines σ as a subsort of σ1 ∈ Σ, then the
cardinality of A+σ is less than or equal to the cardinality of Aσ1 , which is also
finite. The coproduct and quotient cases follow analogously.
Our proof of Theorem 1 will expedited by using the following simple category-
theoretic machinery.7 A first-order theory T has a category of models. A cat-
egory C is a collection of objects with arrows between the objects that satisfy
two basic properties. First, there is an associative composition operation ◦ de-
fined on the arrows of C, and second, every object c in C has an identity arrow
1c : c→ c. We will use the notation Mod(T ) to denote the category of mod-
els of T . An object in Mod(T ) is a model M of T , and an arrow f : M → N
between objects in Mod(T ) is an elementary embedding f : M → N between
the models M and N . One can easily verify that Mod(T ) is a category.
A functor F : C → D between categories C and D is a map from objects
and arrows of C to objects and arrows of D that satisfies
F (f : a→ b) = Ff : Fa→ Fb F (1c) = 1Fc F (g ◦ h) = Fg ◦ Fh
for every arrow f : a → b in C, every object c in C, and every composable
pair of arrows g and h in C. Functors are the “structure-preserving maps”
between categories; they preserve domains, codomains, identity arrows, and the
composition operation. A functor F : C → D is full if for all objects c1, c2 in
C and arrows g : Fc1 → Fc2 in D there exists an arrow f : c1 → c2 in C with
Ff = g. F is faithful if Ff = Fg implies that f = g for all arrows f : c1 → c2
and g : c1 → c2 in C. F is essentially surjective if for every object d in D
there exists an object c in C such that Fc ∼= d. A functor F : C → D that is
full, faithful, and essentially surjective is called an equivalence of categories.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
6The model A+|Σ is the Σ-structure obtained from the Σ+-structure A+ by “forgetting”
the interpretations of symbols in Σ+ − Σ. One can show that the model A+ exists and is
unique up to isomorphism (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015b, Theorem 4.1).
7The reader is encouraged to consult Mac Lane (1971) or Borceux (1994) for further details.
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Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose for contradiction that there is a single-sorted the-
ory T2 that is Morita equivalent to T1. This means that T2 is a Σ2-theory with
σ ∈ Σ2 the unique sort symbol. Let T be the “common Morita extension” of
T1 and T2 to a signature Σ ⊃ Σ1 ∪ Σ2. We consider the model A of T1 de-
fined by Aσi = {i, i′} for each i ∈ N. For every i ∈ N there is an isomorphism
fi : A → A that is the identity on Aσj for j 6= i, but on Aσi maps fi : i 7→ i′
and fi : i
′ 7→ i. The fi : A → A are isomorphisms, and so are elementary
embeddings. This implies that there are infinitely many arrows f : A → A in
the category Mod(T1).
Since T1 and T2 are Morita equivalent, there is an equivalence of categories
F : Mod(T1)→ Mod(T2) such that for every model M of T1
F (M) = M+|Σ2
for some model M+ of T that is isomorphic to an expansion of M (Barrett and
Halvorson, 2015b, Theorem 5.1). We consider the model A+ of T . The Lemma
implies that A+σ is a finite set. This implies that F (A)σ is a finite set. Since
Σ2 contains only the sort σ and F (A)σ is finite, there can be at most finitely
many arrows g : F (A) → F (A) in the category Mod(T2). But since F is an
equivalence and therefore full and faithful, this cannot be the case.
Theorem 1 immediately implies that Quine’s conjecture 1 is false. It is not
the case that every many-sorted theory is Morita equivalent to a single-sorted
theory. This disproof of Quine’s conjecture 1, however, suggests the following
slight modification of the conjecture.
Quine’s conjecture 2
If Σ is a signature with finitely many sorts, then every Σ-theory is Morita equiv-
alent to a single-sorted theory. y
This second version of Quine’s conjecture is true. One proves Quine’s conjecture
2 by explicitly constructing a “corresponding” single-sorted theory T̂ for every
many-sorted theory T . The basic idea behind the construction is intuitive. The
theory T̂ simply replaces the sort symbols that the theory T uses with predicate
symbols.8 It takes some work, however, to make this idea precise.
Let Σ be a signature with finitely many sort symbols σ1, . . . , σn. We begin
by constructing a corresponding signature Σ̂ that contains one sort symbol σ.
The symbols in Σ̂ are defined as follows. For every sort symbol σj ∈ Σ we let
qσj be a predicate symbol of sort σ. For every predicate symbol p ∈ Σ of arity
8This construction recalls the proof that every theory is definitionally equivalent to a theory
that uses only predicate symbols (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015a, Prop. 2). Quine (1937, 1938,
1956, 1963) suggests the basic idea behind our proof, as do Burgess (2005, 12) and Manzano
(1996, 221-2). The theorem that we prove here is much more general than Quine’s results
because we make no assumption about what the theory T is, whereas Quine only considered
Russell’s theory of types and NBG set theory.
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σj1×. . .×σjm we let qp be a predicate symbol of arity σm (the m-fold product of
σ). Likewise, for every function symbol f ∈ Σ of arity σj1×. . .×σjm → σj we let
qf be a predicate symbol of arity σ
m+1. And lastly, for every constant symbol
c ∈ Σ we let dc be a constant symbol of sort σ. The single-sorted signature Σ̂
corresponding to Σ is then defined to be
Σ̂ = {σ} ∪ {qσ1 , . . . , qσn} ∪ {qp : p ∈ Σ} ∪ {qf : f ∈ Σ} ∪ {dc : c ∈ Σ}
We can now describe a method of “translating” Σ-theories into Σ̂-theories.
Let T be an arbitrary Σ-theory. We define a corresponding Σ̂-theory T̂ , and
then show that T̂ is Morita equivalent to T .
We begin by translating the axioms of T into the signature Σ̂. This will take
two steps. First, we describe a way to translate the Σ-terms into Σ̂-formulas.
Given a Σ-term t(x1, . . . , xn), we define the Σ̂-formula ψ̂t(y1, . . . , yn, y) recur-
sively as follows.
• If t(x1, . . . , xn) is the variable xi, then ψ̂t is the Σ̂-formula yi = y.
• If t(x1, . . . , xn) is the constant c, then ψ̂t is the Σ̂-formula dc = y.
• Suppose that t(x1, . . . , xn) is the term f(t1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , tk(x1, . . . , xn))
and that each of the Σ̂-formulas ψ̂ti(y1, . . . , yn, y) have been defined. Then
ψ̂t(y1, . . . , yn, y) is the Σ̂-formula
∃σz1 . . . ∃σzk
(
ψ̂t1(y1, . . . , yn, z1)∧. . .∧ψ̂tk(y1, . . . , yn, zk)∧qf (z1, . . . , zk, y)
)
One can think of the formula ψt(y1, . . . , yn, y) as the translation of the expression
“t(x1, . . . , xn) = x” into the signature Σ̂.
Second, we use this map from Σ-terms to Σ̂-formulas to describe a map
from Σ-formulas to Σ̂-formulas. Given a Σ-formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn), we define the
Σ̂-formula ψ̂(y1, . . . , yn) recursively as follows.
• If ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is t(x1, . . . , xn) = s(x1, . . . , xn), where s and t are Σ-terms
of sort σi, then ψ̂(y1, . . . , yn) is the Σ̂-formula
∃σz
(
ψ̂t(y1, . . . , yn, z) ∧ ψ̂s(y1, . . . , yn, z) ∧ qσi(z)
)
• If ψ(x1, . . . , xn) is p(t1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , tk(x1, . . . , xn)), where p ∈ Σ is a
predicate symbol, then ψ̂(y1, . . . , yn) is the Σ̂-formula
∃σz1 . . . ∃σzk
(
ψ̂t1(y1, . . . , yn, z1)∧ . . .∧ ψ̂tk(y1, . . . , yn, zk)∧ qp(z1, . . . , zk)
)
• This definition extends to all Σ-formulas in the standard way. We define
the Σ̂-formulas ¬̂ψ := ¬ψ̂, ψ̂1 ∧ ψ2 := ψ̂1 ∧ ψ̂2, ψ̂1 ∨ ψ2 := ψ̂1 ∨ ψ̂2, and
̂ψ1 → ψ2 := ψ̂1 → ψ̂2. Furthermore, if ψ(x1, . . . , xn, x) is a Σ-formula,
then we define both of the following:
∀̂σixψ := ∀σy(qσi(y)→ ψ̂(y1, . . . , yn, y))
∃̂σixψ := ∃σy(qσi(y) ∧ ψ̂(y1, . . . , yn, y))
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One should think of the formula ψ̂ as the translation of the Σ-formula ψ into
the signature Σ̂.
This allows us to consider the translations α̂ of the axioms α ∈ T . The
single-sorted theory T̂ will have the Σ̂-sentences α̂ as some of its axioms. But
T̂ will have more axioms than just the sentences α̂. It will also have some
auxiliary axioms. These auxiliary axioms will guarantee that the symbols in
Σ̂ “behave like” their counterparts in Σ. We define auxiliary axioms for the
predicate symbols qσ1 , . . . , qσn ∈ Σ̂, qp ∈ Σ̂, and qf ∈ Σ̂, and for the constant
symbols dc ∈ Σ̂. We discuss each of these four cases in detail.
We first define auxiliary axioms to guarantee that the symbols qσ1 , . . . , qσn
behave like sort symbols. The Σ̂-sentence φ is defined to be ∀σy(qσ1(y) ∨ . . . ∨
qσn(y)).
9 Furthermore, for each sort symbol σj ∈ Σ we define the Σ̂-sentence
φσj to be
∃σy(qσj (y)) ∧ ∀σy
(
qσj (y)→ (¬qσ1(y) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qσj−1(y)
∧ ¬qσj+1(y) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qσn(y))
)
One can think of the sentences φσ1 , . . . , φσn , and φ as saying that “everything
is of some sort, nothing is of more than one sort, and every sort is nonempty.”
Next we define auxiliary axioms to guarantee that the symbols qp, qf , and
dc behave like their counterparts p, f , and c in Σ. For each predicate symbol
p ∈ Σ of arity σj1 × . . .× σjm , we define the Σ̂-sentence φp to be
∀σy1 . . . ∀σym
(
qp(y1, . . . , ym)→
(
qσj1 (y1) ∧ . . . ∧ qσjm (ym)
))
This sentence restricts the extension of qp to the subdomain of n-tuples satisfying
qσj1 , . . . , qσjm , guaranteeing that the predicate qp has “the appropriate arity.”
Consider, for example, the case of a unary predicate p of sort σi. In that case,
φp says that
∀σy(qp(y)→ qσi(y)),
which means that nothing outside the subdomain qσi satisfies qp. Note, however,
that here we have made a conventional choice. We could just as well have
stipulated that qp applies to everything outside of the subdomain qσi . All that
matters here is that qp is trivial (either trivially true, or trivially false) except
on the subdomain of objects satisfying qσi .
For each function symbol f ∈ Σ of arity σj1 × . . .× σjm → σj we define the
Σ̂-sentence φf to be the conjunction
∀σy1 . . . ∀σym∀σy
(
qf (y1, . . . , ym, y)→ (qσj1 (y1) ∧ . . . ∧ qσjm (ym) ∧ qσj (y))
)
∧ ∀σy1 . . . ∀σym
(
(qσj1 (y1) ∧ . . . ∧ qσjm (ym))→ ∃σ=1y(qf (y1, . . . , ym, y))
)
The first conjunct guarantees that the symbol qf has “the appropriate arity,”
and the second conjunct guarantees that qf behaves like a function. Lastly, if
9Note that if there were infinitely many sort symbols in Σ, then we could not define the
Σ̂-sentence φ in this way.
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c ∈ Σ is a constant symbol of arity σj , then we define the Σ̂-sentence φc to be
qσj (dc). This sentence guarantees that the constant symbol dc also has “the
appropriate arity.”
We now have the resources to define a Σ̂-theory T̂ that is Morita equivalent
to T .
T̂ = {α̂ : α ∈ T} ∪ {φ, φσ1 , . . . , φσn}
∪ {φp : p ∈ Σ}
∪ {φf : f ∈ Σ}
∪ {φc : c ∈ Σ}
The theory T̂ has two kinds of axioms, the translated axioms of T and the
auxiliary axioms. These axioms allow T̂ to imitate the theory T in the signature
Σ̂. Indeed, one can prove the following result.
Theorem 2. The theories T and T̂ are Morita equivalent.
The proof of Theorem 2 requires some work, and has therefore been placed
in an appendix. But the idea behind the proof is simple. The theory T needs
to define symbols in Σ̂. It defines the sort symbol σ as a “universal sort,” by
taking the coproduct of the sorts σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ. The theory T then defines the
symbols qp, qf , and dc in Σ̂ simply by using the corresponding symbols p, f ,
and c in Σ. Likewise, the theory T̂ needs to define the symbols in Σ. It defines
the sort symbol σj as the subsort of “things that are qσj” for each j = 1, . . . , n.
And T̂ defines the symbols p, f , and c again by using the corresponding symbols
qp, qf , and dc.
Since the theory T was arbitrary, Theorem 2 immediately implies that
Quine’s conjecture 2 is true.
Philosophical implications
Our proof of Quine’s conjecture 2 substantiates Quine’s original thought about
the relationship between many-sorted logic and single-sorted logic. It captures a
precise sense in which single-sorted logic has exactly the same expressive power
as (finitely) many-sorted logic.
In capturing this relationship, our results provide a reason to prefer Morita
equivalence over definitional equivalence. The original motivation for taking
definitional equivalence as the standard for theoretical equivalence is intuitive:
Definitional equivalence captures a sense in which two theories are intertrans-
latable. If T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent, then there are two precise
ways to translate between the theories.
• The first way of translating between T1 and T2 is purely syntactic. For-
mulas of T1 can be translated into the signature of T2, and vice versa, and
these translations have some nice features. In particular, theorems are
translated into theorems, and the two translations are “almost inverse” to
one another (Barrett and Halvorson, 2015a, Theorem 1).
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• The second way of translating is semantic. Models of T1 can be trans-
lated into models of T2, and vice versa, and these translations also have
some nice features. In particular, the two translations induce a categorical
equivalence between the categories of models of the two theories (Barrett
and Halvorson, 2015b, Theorems 3.1 and 5.1).
Morita equivalence also captures a sense in which two theories are intertranslat-
able. Indeed, if two theories are Morita equivalent, then in this case too, one can
translate formulas and convert models between them (Barrett and Halvorson,
2015b, Theorems 4.3 and 5.1).
The motivation for taking definitional equivalence as the standard for theo-
retical equivalence therefore carries over to Morita equivalence. But our results
show that Morita equivalence has a virtue that definitional equivalence lacks.
In particular, if one follows Glymour (1971, 1977, 1980) in taking definitional
equivalence as the standard for theoretical equivalence, then one cannot recover
any sense in which Quine’s conjecture is true. If one wants to substantiate
Quine’s conjecture and capture the relationship between the many-sorted and
single-sorted frameworks, one needs to move to Morita equivalence.
Our discussion also yields a cautionary remark concerning a particular ar-
gument of Quine’s. One might be tempted to conclude from Theorem 2 that
many-sorted logic is dispensable. In fact, this is precisely the conclusion that
Quine himself drew. Quine says that explicitly naming sorts and specifying
the sorts of the vocabulary in the signature of a theory is an “artificial device”
(Quine and Carnap, 1990, 409), and that we are licensed to ignore it. He sums
up his negative stance on many-sorted logic as follows:
All in all, I find an overwhelming case for a single unpartitioned uni-
verse of values of bound variables, and a simple grammar of predica-
tion which admits general terms all on an equal footing. Subsidiary
distinctions can still be drawn as one pleases, both on methodologi-
cal considerations and on considerations of natural kind; but we may
think of them as distinctions special to the sciences and unreflected
in the structure of our notation (Quine, 1960, 229).10
Quine’s reasoning here may be seductive, but it is nonetheless misleading. We
have shown that for each theory T in a signature Σ with finitely many sorts,
there is a Morita equivalent single-sorted theory T̂ . This result does not show
that we can ignore sorts altogether. There are a number of reasons for this.
First, in capturing the sense in which Quine’s conjecture is true, one relies on
Morita equivalence, a standard of equivalence that is itself inherently many-
sorted. If one does away with the many-sorted framework altogether, one can
no longer capture this equivalence; the single-sorted framework simply does not
provide one with a criterion for equivalence that is capable of substantiating
Quine’s conjecture.
10For other expressions of this same attitude, see Quine (1951, 69–71), Quine (1963, 267–8),
and Quine and Carnap (1990, 409).
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The many-sorted framework simply allows us to better recognize the variety
of ways in which theories might be equivalent. For example, one might want
to consider Euclidean geometry formulated using lines to be equivalent to Eu-
clidean geometry formulated using points. Although both of these theories are
single-sorted, the single-sorted framework does not allow one to consider them
equivalent. With Morita equivalence in hand, however, the many-sorted frame-
work does allow one capture this equivalence (Barrett and Halvorson, 2016).
The issue here is that two single-sorted theories might have different sorts, in
which case there is a non-trivial question about whether these sorts can be de-
fined from each other. One theory’s single sort might, for example, be definable
as a product of another theory’s single sort. In particular, this means that two
single-sorted theories can be Morita equivalent even if they are not definitionally
equivalent. The following simple example serves to illustrate this fact.
Example. Consider the signatures Σ1 = {σ1} and Σ2 = {σ2, p}, where σ1
and σ2 are sort symbols, and p is a unary predicate of sort σ2. We define the
following two theories.
T1 = {∃σ1=1x (x = x)}
T2 = {∃σ2=2y (y = y),∃σ2=1y p(y)}
The Σ1-theory T1 says “there is only one thing”, while the Σ2-theory T2 says
“there are exactly two things, the first is p, and the second is ¬p.” These two
theories are Morita equivalent. In order to prove this, one shows that T1 can
define all of the symbols that T2 uses, and vice versa. The theory T1 defines
the sort symbol σ2 as the coproduct of the sort σ1 with itself, and then defines
the predicate p to hold of the element in the image of the canonical injection ρ1
that is associated with the new coproduct sort σ2. And on the other hand, the
theory T2 defines the sort symbol σ1 as the subsort of “things that are p.” T1
and T2 are therefore Morita equivalent.
Suppose, however, that we were to follow Quine and ignore the apparatus of
sorts when considering these theories T1 and T2. That is, suppose that we were
to treat T1 and T2 as if they were both formulated using the same single sort
symbol. The single-sorted framework then gives us no way of recognizing any
sense in which these theories are equivalent. The theory T1 implies that “there
is one thing”, while the theory T2 implies that “there are two things.” These
implications contradict one another, so T1 and T2 do not even have a common
conservative extension, let alone a common definitional extension.11 They are
therefore not definitionally equivalent. If we ignore the apparatus of sorts when
considering the theories T1 and T2, then we are also forced to forget a natural
sense in which they are equivalent theories.12
11Note that if we remember that T1 and T2 use different sort symbols (as we did in the
example above), then we can recognize that they have a common conservative extension. In
this case, T1 implies that “there is one thing of sort σ1”, while T2 implies that “there are two
things of sort σ2”, and these implications no longer contradict one another.
12Manzano (1996, 221-2) puts our attitude nicely: “It is well-known that many-sorted logic
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When Quine argues that nothing of philosophical significance turns on the
use of many-sorted as opposed to single-sorted logic, therefore, he is quite mis-
taken. Indeed, recall that Quine used the fact that many-sorted logic could
be reduced to single-sorted logic as a tool in his debates with Carnap. While
Carnap finds many-sorted logic helpful for capturing the phenomenon of cat-
egory mistakes, Quine claims that it is more convenient to say that sentences
committing category mistakes are meaningful, but trivially false:
[. . . ] the many-sorted is translatable into one-sorted. Generally such
translation has the side effect of admitting as meaningful some erst-
while meaningless predications. E.g., if the predicate “divisible by
3” is henceforth to be trained on general variables instead of number
variables, we must make sense of calling things other than numbers
divisible by 3. But this is easy; we may count such attributions as
false instead of meaningless (Quine, 1969, 96).
Quine has again missed a beat here. Recall that in eliminating sort distinctions,
we had to make a conventional choice.13 For a predicate that originally was
restricted to things of a particular sort, what should we say about its application
to things of another sort? Should we say that it applies to all such things, or
to no such things? There is no default answer here because we have to consider
the question both for a predicate and for its negation (in which case our answers
will be opposite to each other).
Consider a particular example. The predicates “prime” and “composite”
are defined on the domain of natural numbers. Now suppose that we unify
the domain of natural numbers with the domain of 20th century philosophers.
Following Quine’s suggestion, we should count the attribution of “prime” to
philosophers as false, e.g. “Carnap is prime,” is considered false. By the same
reasoning, we also count the attribution of “composite” (i.e. “not prime”) to
philosophers as false, e.g. “Carnap is composite,” is considered false. But then
Carnap is neither prime nor not-prime, which cannot be tolerated within the
framework of classical logic.
Quine is therefore wrong when he claims that “we may count such attribu-
tions as false.” If we count all such attributions as false, then we land ourselves
in a contradiction. We have to choose which attributions are true, and which
are false. The many-sorted framework allows us to refrain from making such
conventional choices, which could easily be mistaken for assertions. And this is
an advantage of the framework. It does not force us to apply predicates in cases
where we have no good reason to say that they do (or do not) hold of the items
in question.
Recent philosophical literature has devoted significant attention to logic and
quantifiers, but relatively little to the device of sorts.14 Some of us felt justified
reduces to [single-sorted] logic, and this approach is the one commonly used in textbooks.
[. . . ] What is not usually said in textbooks is that the reduction has a price.”
13See our definition of the sentence φp and the surrounding discussion in the construction
of the theory Tˆ .
14Of course, there are exceptions, such as Turner (2010).
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to ignore sorts because we believed Quine when he claimed that every theory
can be replaced by a single-sorted variant. But when we look at the actual
mechanics of how this replacement works, it becomes clear that Quine was mis-
taken about the philosophical upshot of the logical facts. Many-sorted theories
are eliminable only to the extent that Morita equivalence is a reasonable notion
of equivalence, and Morita equivalence only makes sense in the framework of
many-sorted logic. When we forget the apparatus of sorts, we are also foced for-
get a particularly natural and useful criterion for theoretical equivalence. And
in addition, eliminating sort distinctions forces us to make unnecessary conven-
tional choices about how to extend predicates beyond their original range of
application.
Through a bit of logical legerdemain, Quine convinced a generation of philoso-
phers that formal logic can do without the apparatus of sorts. But the formal
result — that each theory can be replaced with a single-sorted variant — does
not support the philosophical conclusion. If we forget about the apparatus of
sorts and replace each theory with a single-sorted variant, then philosophical
questions will be begged and an interesting point of view will be lost.
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Appendix
The objective of this appendix is to prove Theorem 2. We prove a special case
of the result for convenience. We will assume that Σ has only three sort symbols
σ1, σ2, σ3 and that Σ does not contain function or constant symbols. A perfectly
analogous (though more tedious) proof goes through in the general case.
We prove the result by explicitly constructing a “common Morita extension”
T4 ∼= T̂4 of T and T̂ to the following signature.
Σ+ = Σ ∪ Σ̂ ∪ {σ12} ∪ {ρ1, ρ2, ρ12, ρ3} ∪ {i1, i2, i3}
The symbol σ12 ∈ Σ+ is a sort symbol. The symbols denoted by subscripted ρ








The symbols i1, i2, and i3 are function symbols with arity σ1 → σ, σ2 → σ, and
σ3 → σ, respectively.
We now turn to the proof.


















Steps 1–3 define the theories T̂1, . . . , T̂4, steps 4–6 define T1, . . . , T4, and step 7
shows that T4 and T̂4 are logically equivalent.
Step 1. We begin by defining the theory T̂1. For each sort σj ∈ Σ we
consider the following sentence.
∀σy
(
qσj (y)↔ ∃σjx(ij(x) = y)
)
∧ ∀σjx1∀σjx2(ij(x1) = ij(x2)→ x1 = x2)
(θσj )
The sentence θσj defines the symbols σj and ij as the subsort of “things that are
qσj .” The auxiliary axioms φσj of T̂ guarantee that the admissibility conditions
for these definitions are satisfied. The theory T̂1 = T̂ ∪{θσ1 , θσ2 , θσ3} is therefore
a Morita extension of T̂ to the signature Σ̂ ∪ {σ1, σ2, σ3, i1, i2, i3}.
Step 2. We now define the theories T̂2 and T̂3. Let θσ12 be a sentence that
defines the symbols σ12, ρ1, ρ2 as a coproduct sort. The theory T̂2 = T̂1 ∪{θσ12}
is clearly a Morita extension of T̂1. We have yet to define the function symbols
ρ12 and ρ3. The following two sentences define these symbols.
∀σ3x∀σy(ρ3(x) = y ↔ i3(x) = y) (θρ3)
∀σ12x∀σy(ρ12(x) = y ↔ ψ(x, y)) (θρ12)
The sentence θρ3 simply defines ρ3 to be equal to the function i3. For the
sentence θρ12 , we define the formula ψ(x, y) to be
∃σ1z1
(
ρ1(z1) = x ∧ i1(z1) = y
) ∨ ∃σ2z2(ρ2(z2) = x ∧ i2(z2) = y)
We should take a moment here to understand the definition θρ12 . We want to
define what the function ρ12 does to an element a of sort σ12. Since the sort
σ12 is the coproduct of the sorts σ1 and σ2, the element a must “actually be”
of one of the sorts σ1 or σ2. (The disjuncts in the formula ψ(x, y) correspond
to these possibilities.) The definition θρ12 stipulates that if a is “actually” of
sort σj , then the value of ρ12 at a is the same as the value of ij at a. One
can verify that T̂2 satisfies the admissibility conditions for θρ3 and θρ12 , so the
theory T̂3 = T̂2 ∪ {θρ3 , θρ12} is a Morita extension of T̂2 to the signature
Σ̂ ∪ {σ1, σ2, σ3, σ12, i1, i2, i3, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ12}
Step 3. We now describe the Σ+-theory T̂4. This theory defines the predi-
cates in the signature Σ. Let p ∈ Σ be a predicate symbol of arity σj1×. . .×σjm .
We consider the following sentence.
∀σj1x1 . . . ∀σjmxm (p(x1, . . . , xm)↔ qp(ij1(x1), . . . , ijm(xm))) (θp)
The theory T̂4 = T̂3 ∪ {θp : p ∈ Σ} is therefore a Morita extension of T̂3 to the
signature Σ+.
Step 4. We turn to the left-hand side of our organizational figure and define
the theories T1 and T2. We proceed in an analogous manner to the first part of
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Step 2. The theory T1 = T ∪ {θσ12} is a Morita extension of T to the signature
Σ∪ {σ12, ρ1, ρ2}. Now let θσ be the sentence that defines the symbols σ, ρ12, ρ3
as a coproduct sort. The theory T2 = T1 ∪ {θσ} is a Morita extension of T1 to
the signature Σ ∪ {σ12, σ, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ12}.
Step 5. This step defines the function symbols i1, i2, and i3. We consider
the following sentences.
∀σ3x3∀σy(i3(x3) = y ↔ ρ3(x3) = y) (θi3)
∀σ2x2∀σy
(





i1(x1) = y ↔ ∃σ12z(ρ1(x1) = z ∧ ρ12(z) = y)
)
(θi1)
The sentence θi3 defines the function symbol i3 to be equal to ρ3. The sentence
θi2 defines the function symbol i2 to be equal to the composition “ρ12 ◦ ρ2.”
Likewise, the sentence θi1 defines the function symbol i1 to be “ρ12 ◦ ρ1.” The
theory T3 = T2 ∪ {θi1 , θi2 , θi3} is a Morita extension of T2 to the signature
Σ ∪ {σ12, σ, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ12, i1, i2, i3}.
Step 6. We still need to define the predicate symbols in Σ̂. Let σj ∈ Σ be a
sort symbol and p ∈ Σ a predicate symbol of arity σj1 × . . .× σjm . We consider
the following sentences.
∀σy(qσj (y)↔ ∃σjx(ij(x) = y)) (θqσj )
∀σy1 . . . ∀σym
(
qp(y1, . . . , ym)↔∃σj1x1 . . . ∃σjmxm(ij1(x1) = y1 ∧ . . .
∧ ijm(xm) = ym ∧ p(x1, . . . , xm))
) (θqp)
These sentences define the predicates qσj ∈ Σ̂ and qp ∈ Σ̂. One can verify that
T3 satisfies the admissibility conditions for the definitions θqσj . And therefore
the theory T4 = T3 ∪ {θqσ1 , θqσ2 , θqσ3} ∪ {θqp : p ∈ Σ} is a Morita extension of
T3 to the signature Σ
+.
Step 7. It only remains to show that the Σ+-theories T4 and T̂4 are logically
equivalent. One can verify by induction on the complexity of ψ that
T4  ψ ↔ ψ̂ and T̂4  ψ ↔ ψ̂. (5)
for every Σ-sentence ψ. One then uses (5) to show that Mod(T4) = Mod(T̂4).
The argument involves a number of cases, but since each case is straightforward
we leave them to the reader to verify. The theories T4 and T̂4 are logically
equivalent, which implies that T and T̂ are Morita equivalent.
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